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DEFENCE AND THE SCOTTISH ENVIRONMENT 
Malcolm Spaven 
Introduction 
The crumbling of the great edifice of Soviet military power in the past 
three years has been one of the most profound political changes in Europe's 
history. The West has watched with amazement- and not a little regret in some 
circles - the sweeping away of the old certainties of oppressive centralised 
states and entrenched military superiority. 
The effect on state and society in the East European countries has been 
immediate. Slowly at first, western states have also begun to adjust to the new 
reality- that the cornerstone of their defence policies for the last 40 years, the 
assumption of impending aggression by an imperialistic Soviet Union, has 
collapsed. Much has been written about the effects of these changes on 
NATO's force structure, doctrine and strategy(!). But the longer term- and 
arguably, more profound - impact on the fundamental relationship between 
state and society in the countries of western Europe and North America has 
had little airing. 
Societies which do not feel threatened - internally or externally - are 
unlikely to support high state spending on military forces. The decline of the 
Soviet threat has opened up the possibility that the level of resources allocated 
to the military, and the policy and posture of the armed forces, may be more 
openly subjected to non-military determinants or influences. This has two 
elements: the erosion of the military's traditional exclusivity of decision-
making, which has in the past severely restricted the extent to which the public 
- and Parliament - could scrutinise or participate in decision-making about 
defence; and secondly, the decreasing relative importance of national defence 
in the face of growing public awareness of and concern about environmental 
issues. 
In this regard, the military is rather vulnerable to public criticism. The 
design of modern weaponry places a premium on maximising destructiveness, 
while the trend in the doctrine of warfare is towards greater mobility of forces, 
requiring wider expanses of training land. Greater physical damage is caused 
by live firing as the lethality of weapons increases; technological advances have 
led to more military training taking place at night; in the air, the intensity and 
frequency of noise disturbance from low flying aircraft has become a major 
source of friction between the public and the military; and at sea, fishermen 
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face the dangers of picking up spent weaponry in their nets and of submarines 
snagging their equipment, with potentially fatal results(2l. 
Military operations also involve the handling of a wide variety of toxic 
materials, such as nuclear fuel for submarines, fissile material for nuclear 
warheads, a variety of fuels, conventional explosives, PCBs in electrical 
equipment, and solvents. Defence installations are therefore a source of a 
considerable range of pollutants. 
It has also been argued that there are positive aspects to the military's 
impact on the environment: in particular, that the exclusion of the public from 
certain environmentally-sensitive defence lands has allowed particular rare 
species of plants, insects, birds and animals to thrive;Pl but in the terms of this 
paper, which addresses the role of environmental concern in shaping the 
future of social relations between civil society and the military, these specific 
biological impacts are likely to be of lesser significance than the questions of 
access, public safety and lack of accountability which tend to dominate the 
public debate about military-environmental issues. This is not to deny the 
value of the concept of restricted areas or sanctuaries for protection of 
particular habitats or species; merely to illustrate that civil-military relations in 
the environmental field are not simply about the merits and demerits of 
particular biological impacts, but can be seen as a facet of a much wider debate 
about the role of the military in society. 
With this background of a declining threat, increasing intensity of military 
impacts on the environment, and growing public awareness of 'quality of life' 
issues, military-environmental impacts may become an important focus ofthe 
changing relationship between the military and civil society. In Scotland, 
where the belief that the country suffers a uniquely heavy burden of 
militarisation is widespread,<4l the impact of the military on the social and 
physical environment is likely to play a central role in civil-military relations as 
a whole. 
The magnitude of the shifts in civil-military relations is potentially 
enormous. It would have seemed inconceivable twenty or even ten years ago 
that Britain might find itself in a position where substantial elements of its 
defence posture were dictated not by the best way to mount a credible defence 
against a commonly-accepted military threat, but by what politicians 
considered the domestic population could bear in terms of military 
environmental impact. However, that prospect is now becoming reality in a 
number of areas of military activity. The government has committed itself not 
to increase the amount of low flying training in Britain, in deference to public 
opposition; large-scale field exercises have been abandoned in Germany to 
placate angry farmers and rural citizens; intended Ministry of Defence land 
acquisitions in Scotland, designed to meet established training requirements, 
have been abandoned in the face of public opposition<5l. 
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The Military Nation 
Britain is unique among the European members of NATO in having all-
volunteer armed forces. Conscription was abandoned in 1957, as part of a plan 
to move Britain's military posture firmly into the nuclear-technological era. 
Increased technical sophistication, the need for access to training grounds, and 
a decline in the use of the military for internal policing or civil emergency roles, 
have tended to reduce the presence of military personnel in urban areas, where 
the bulk of Britain's population lives. As a result, the military's direct impact 
on civilian society - with the notable exception of Northern Ireland - is 
relatively small. In West Germany, armed troops and columns of tanks are 
seen on the streets of many towns on a regular basis. Direct contact of that sort 
between military training and large numbers of civilians is unheard of in 
mainland Britain, and would likely be regarded as alien and unacceptable. 
As noted above, there is a widely-held view - almost a commonplace-
that Scots bear a particularly heavy military burden. But how militarised is 
Scotland? Can it be said that there are particularly high concentrations of 
troops, installations, or military spending north of the border? Or 
alternatively, is the perception of militarisation based more on wider social 
values such as alienation of Scots from political decision-making in Whitehall, 
lack of democratic accountability, and contrasts between civil economic 
decline and highly visible heavy-investment in defence projects? 
In the 1970s, John Erickson described Scotland's relationship with the 
military as being at "a curious crossroads" between the nostalgia of pibroch 
and tartan, and the abstraction of the "strategic environment" and its 
associated high technology(6l. Nearly a decade and a half on, little has changed 
- an indication, perhaps, that what appeared then as a crossroads was simply 
the enduring dichotomy between romantic myth and poorly understood 
reality. Even today, national and regional identification with particular 
regiments of the British Army -largely a product of the Crown's "pacification" 
of the Highlands after the Jacobite rebellions -is a central element in the 
Army's recruitment strategy in Scotland, and also provides a basis for local 
civil-military linkages through Territorial Army (TA) infantry units. 
The steadfastness of this image of Scotland's military role as, above all, a 
reliable pool of unskilled labour for the British infantry is given some credence 
by the recruitment figures. Between 1979 and 1987, Scotland contributed 
between 10 and 12% of all new non-officer recruits to the armed services. This 
is only marginally greater than Scotland's share of the UK population, but 
there were notable differences in recruitment to each of the four services, with 
the Army taking between 11.3 and 14.4% of its recruits from Scotland, the 
RAF around 9-10%, theN avy 8-9%, and the Marines as little as 6-7% (?). What 
these figures also show is that the demographic and social factors which are 
causing a decline in recruitment across the whole of western Europe are 
affecting Scotland in equal measure. More than 5,000 Scots joined the armed 
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services in 1979-80, but by 1986-87 the annual recruitment figure was down to 
just over 3,000(8l. 
The notion that Scots are somehow more favourably disposed to service in 
the military is also borne out by the figures for membership of the Territorial 
Army and other part-time or reserve forces. In 1987, reserve units stationed in 
Scotland accounted for some 12.7% of all British military reserve personnel. 
The Scottish proportion was particularly high among the more specialised 
units such as the Royal Auxiliary Air Force (a large proportion of whose total 
UK staff are Scottish-based), but even among the basic TA units and the 
newly-formed Home Service Force, Scotland's share was 12.4% and 17.4% 
respectively, both significantly above expected levels on the basis of share of 
population(9l. 
In terms of the "export" of military personnel, then, Scotland would 
appear to have a rather higher degree of militarisation than the UK as a whole. 
But what of the "import" of personnel - the numbers of military personnel 
stationed in Scotland? The latest available figures show that 20,000 British 
military personnel were stationed in Scotland as at 1st July 1989-9% of the 
UK total. The equivalent figure in 1980was 7.6%. This indicates that Scotland 
hosts slightly fewer military personnel than its share of the UK population, 
though the proportion has evidently been rising in the 1980sP0l. 
Interestingly, despite the perpetuation of the romantic image of the 
fiersome kilted Highlander charging into battle to the skirl of the pipes- that 
"heady ingredient in the Scottish pantheon of myths"(II)- the Army is a 
relatively insignificant element of the military presence in Scotland. In recent 
years there have been around 3,000 Army personnel based in Scotland, 
compared to 8,000 each in the Navy and RAF'12l. Those Army units that are 
based north of the border are mostly locally-recruited infantry, so the classic 
high environmental impact land forces activities which cause so much public 
protest in West Germany- such as tank manoeuvres and artillery firing- are 
largely absent from the Scottish scene(IJ). 
The figures for civilian employees of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) are 
somewhat more complex, since the privatisation of the Royal Ordnance 
Factories (ROF) - with their Scottish facility at Bishopton, near Glasgow 
Airport - in 1985 and the contractorisation of the Rosyth naval dockyard in 
1987 have removed their personnel from the statistics. In 1979, there were just 
under 22,000 civilian employees of the MoD in Scotland (including 2,300 at 
ROF Bishopton, over 4,000 at the Clyde Submarine Base, and around 8,000 at 
Rosyth)- some 9.5% of the UK total. However Scotland's proportion had 
declined to 8.5% by 1988, reflecting the heavy concentration on now-
privatised facilities north of the border(14l. MoD civilian manpower has of 
course declined rapidly over the whole of the UK in this period, both through 
privatisation measures and sweeping efficiency drives which have driven down 
levels of employment UK-wide. Reflecting these policies, there are now less 
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than 12,000 MoD civilian employees in Scotland- a decline of around 45% in 
ten years. Many of these jobs have not, of course, disappeared, but merely 
transferred to private companies; but the decline in numbers employed at 
ROF Bishopton and the Rosyth naval dockyard, which started before 
privatisation, has continued since. In summary, MoD civil employment in 
Scotland is no greater, and perhaps a little less, than Scotland's share of the 
UK population. 
One other important element of the military presence in Scotland is the 
number of US military personnel. There are approximately 3,400 US military 
personnel stationed in Scotland- some 11% of the total number of United 
States military personnel in the UK as a whole- rather higher than the Scottish 
share of the UK population05l. The overall figure is, however, likely to be 
rather higher, after taking into account US civilian contractors' employees and 
civilian employees of the US government, such as the National Security 
Agency cryptologists and radio specialists employed at Edzell. 
There seems to be little evidence, then, of a military invasion of Scotland 
as far as numbers of personnel are concerned. What then of the impact of 
military installations on their local economies? Military bases provide a 
contribution to the local economy through local purchases of goods and 
services and through payments made to local authorities in lieu of rates. These 
economic linkages are an important part of the military-civil relationship, for 
in many cases they form much of the basis for local public support for the 
military presence. There is undoubtedly a trade-off to be made between 
adverse environmental impact and local economic gain - critics of aircraft 
noise in, for example, Moray or Fife tend to argue for mitigation measures 
rather than removal of the source. 
The evidence suggests that, though important on a local scale, the 
amounts of money involved are, generally speaking, insignificant. The total 
value of all local purchases of goods and services by military establishments in 
Scotland in 1985-86 was only £8.8 million, with an additional £1.5 million going 
to local contractors for services to the MoD. Extension of privatisation of 
defence services since then is likely to have increased the latter figure, but the 
overall amounts remain low06l. 
Wage bills are in a rather higher bracket. In the mid-1980s, service 
personnel based in Scotland were paid some £200 million a year in wages and 
salaries. The 12,000 MoD civil service personnel can be assumed to have 
earned around another £120 million a year in that period. Past studies of the 
multiplier effect of military bases would suggest that these wage and salary 
payments resulted in a contribution to the Scottish economy of some £400-
£500 million per annum<t?). Crown facilities are not required to pay the 
business rate as such, but have in the past made payments in lieu of rates to the 
local authority. The requirement for service personel to pay the poll tax-
unless they are Americans - has engendered considerable resentment and 
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political controversy, but is a further source of economic gain to the local 
community. Again, however, these are relatively insignificant amounts when 
viewed on a regional or national scale. For example, Highland Region, which 
contains about a quarter of all MoD land in Scotland, including some relatively 
high rateable value installations such as fuel depots, was receiving less than 2% 
of its rating income from military establishments in the early 1980s<ts). 
In Central Scotland, a more relevant measure of militarisation of the 
economy - and therefore a guide to likely levels of support for defence 
spending- is the degree to which industry is dependent on the defence budget. 
Thanks to some notable work by MoD statisticians in the mid-1980s, statistics 
on regional shares of defence expenditure, and resultant employment, are now 
available. They show that the estimated number of people employed directly 
in Scotland by prime equipment contractors to the MoD was 16,000 in 1987-88 
- around 9% of such employment for the UK as a whole (approximately the 
same as the Scottish share of the UK population), or 4% of total 
manufacturing employment in Scotland (the same as the national average 
share). Defence industry prime contractor employment in Scotland has 
dropped by 11% - 2,000 jobs - in two years, but this reflects the general 
downward trend in UK manufacturing employment as a whole. 
If Scotland seems to do relatively well in terms of jobs created by UK 
defence equipment spending, its share of procurement expenditure is not so 
impressive- between 6 and 7.5% of the UK total in recent years. Reflecting 
this, the MoD's figures show that Scotland only receives around £110 per head 
in MoD equipment spending, compared to £220 per head in south west 
England (dominated by British Aerospace at Bristol and Westland 
Helicopters), £170 in the south east, and £160 in the north of England<19l. 
The future of the defence industry now looks extremely bleak. From a 
1981-82 peak of around 740,000, the number of jobs sustained by military 
spending in the UK as a whole shrank by more than 23% to565,000in 1986-87. 
Scotland's direct defence equipment manufacturing employment grew from 
an estimated 14,600 in 1976 to 18,000 in 1985-86, but had slipped back to 
16,000 by 1987-88(20). 
Given the evaporation of the rationale for much defence equipment, no 
programme is now sacred, and Scotland's defence employees may be 
particularly vulnerable. Ferranti's radar division, taken over by GEC in early 
1990, employs some 6,000 people in Scotland - the largest single 
manufacturing employer in the country. But despite diversification into civil 
products, GEC-Ferranti remains heavily dependent on military work. The 
future of the company's Scottish operations are tied inextricably with the 
European Fighter Aircraft project. A German decision to pull out of the 
project, now increasingly likely as German unification becomes a reality, 
would spell redundancy for many skilled workers in the Edinburgh area. The 
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several Central Scotland Labour MPs, not noted for their predisposition to 
high military spending, lobbying hard for the government to maintain its 
commitment to this hugely expensive and militarily questionable aircraft(ZI). 
The other major military producer in Scotland, Yarrow's shipyard in 
Clyde bank, is also highly vulnerable to the current trends in defence spending. 
Yarrow's have been dependent for the last few years on increasingly rare 
frigate orders from the MoD. In the present climate, the high unit cost projects 
such as Type 23 frigates (around £120 million each) may well be an easy option 
for cuts, and there is no indication that even an incoming Labour government 
would rejuvenate spending on such 'gold-plated' projects. 
The defence industry, then, is declining in importance in terms of its rank 
in the Scottish economy, and although significant on a local scale in places such 
as Moray and Dumbartonshire, the contribution of military bases to the 
Scottish economy remains small. Privatisation of defence services and 
reductions in MoD civilian employment have further reduced these 
contributions. The result is likely to be less political commitment to military 
production for employment protection reasons. In conjunction with the 
widespread public appreciation of a declining threat, this will make many 
military-related projects more susceptible to competing social and economic 
priorities and to environmental scrutiny. 
The Land Question 
One final method of measuring the degree of militarisation of Scotland-
and a central feature of the debate on the environmental impact of the military 
-is land use. 
The ownership and use of land has been ~me of the most contentious and 
enduring social issues in Scottish history, and is firmly embedded in the 
national psyche. Hackneyed though they may be, historical references to the 
post-Jacobite pacification of the Highlands, the Clearances, and more recent 
events such as the stand against the landlords by the Seven Men of Knoydart 
are nevertheless a real and potent element of Scottish popular attitudes to 
land. John McGrath has argued that the history of land ownership in Scotland 
is "significantly different from that of neighbouring nations"; Scotland "did 
not have its own bourgeois revolution- it inherited the fruits of the English one 
by the Act of Union. But this Act and the subsequent growth of Scottish capital 
was carefully 'managed' by the Scottish aristocracy. The aristocrats had 
accumulated their own wealth not because they were skilful merchants, but 
because they owned vast acres of land"(22l. 
As agents of the Crown, the military may be seen in popular culture as 
replicating many of the attributes of the lairds - beyond democratic 
accountability, symbolising allegiance to alien masters, and using large areas 
of land in an unproductive way. 
194 
Scottish Government Yearbook 1991 
The focus of the land debate has shifted somewhat in the 1980s from 
landlordism and the economic use of Scotland's vast upland areas, to questions 
of 'conservation versus development', and to recreational use of upland areas 
- witness the heated arguments over geese and the whisky industry in I slay, 
forestry and peat extraction on the moors of Caithness, and the Lurcher's 
Gully ski development in the Cairngorms. 
But the core questions- who owns and controls the land; public access; 
productive use; conservation of natural resources- are all pertinent in the case 
of military use of the land. MoD ownership exemplifies lack of local control of 
land resources; the nature of military operations frequently necessitates 
debarring public access; military training is non-productive; and conservation 
aims may be at odds with military requirements. 
Much of the current pattern of defence land use in Britain is a product of 
the Second World War. Almost five million hectares of land- about 20% of 
the UK- were in military use between 1939 and 1945. Only two years after the 
end of the war, the UK total was cut more than ten-fold, to some 400,000 
hectares, and remained at about that level until the report of the Defence 
Lands Committee, under Lord Nugent, in 1973. Nugent's task was to 
rationalise the defence estate, cut out waste and duplication, and release as 
much land as possible for more productive use. The report only recommended 
release of some 13,000 hectares, but successive governments in the 1970s and 
1980s have continued the commitment to reduce the overall holdings of land 
by the MoD, and the total defence estate was down to less than 300,000 
hectares by the late 1970s and to a low of just under 240,000 hectares in 
1987(23). 
Since then, however, military land holdings have started to expand again. 
Two factors have caused this reversal of the post-war contraction. First, the 
Conservative government since 1979 has expanded the Territorial and 
Auxiliary forces from 77,000 to over 90,000. New units have been created, 
including many with a new emphasis on Home Defence tasks. These new units 
require training areas within easy reach oftheir bases. Secondly, the increased 
range, firepower and destructiveness of modern weaponry necessitates larger 
safety zones around weapons ranges. Consequently, the government's plans 
for T A expansion and re-equipment of the Army led to a re-appraisal of 
defence land requirements, resulting in the Barron Report, an internal MoD 
document, which concluded that an additional20,000 hectares of training land 
were required for the Army to meet these needs. The Ministry's training land 
acquisition programme in 1986-87 alone amounted to just under 6,000 
hectares(24l. 
The Barron Report has particular relevance for Scotland. The existence 
of a requirement for an additional 20,000 hectares of training land only 
emerged when, in late 1982, local people became aware that Army personnel 
were inspecting the Knoydart estate (some 21,000 hectares) in the West 
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Highlands, with a view to purchase. After a major public outcry, the MoD
withdrew its interest, but one year later made it known that they were still 
looking for suitable sites<25l. One very large training area is far from ideal, 
however, in terms of training requirements. Had the MoD taken over
Knoydart, this would have been a prized asset for major amphibious landing 
exercises, multi-function training and a variety of weapons range facilities, but 
its location would have meant massive expenditure on transporting troops 
from and to their bases - many of them as far away as Devon and Cornwall-
and would have effectively ruled out its use by the expanding T A, whose 
training is mostly carried out over limited periods at weekends and who 
therefore require training areas close to their bases. 
Since the withdrawal from Knoydart, the MoD has preferred to pursue 
smaller individual land acquisitions, principally on the fringes of existing 
training areas. Not only are these more suited to training requirements, but 
they are perhaps less prone to adverse publicity and opposition on a national 
scale, which could lead to blocking of purchases or unacceptable restriction of
training activities. 
In Scotland, MoD owned or leased land holdings have remained fairly 
constant over the past ten years. The decline from a total of22,100 hectares in 
1980 to 20,700 hectares in 1989 was accounted for almost entirely by the 
transfer to private ownership in 1985 of the Royal Ordnance Factory at 
Bishopton in Renfrewshire<26l. 
However, the situation looks rather different when military training rights 
are taken into account. The total MoD land holdings in Scotland, including 
land over which rights are held, increased from 24,800 hectares in 1980, to 
91,200 hectares in 1989- an expansion of 268%. This massive increase was 
accounted for mainly by the RAF's acquisition of rights to carry out 
'expedition training' over 5,700 hectares of the Auchallater Estate, near 
Braemar, in 1980, and the acquisition of Army training rights over 50,000 
hectares of Forestry Commission land in Galloway and 11,679 hectares of 
British Aluminium Company land in the hinterland of Kinlochleven, in 1987. 
Rights to a further 500 hectares ofland in Scotland were acquired in 1988, and 
purchase of an additional 1 ,500 hectares at the Garelochhead Army training 
camp has not yet entered the statistics<27l. 
The increases in training rights offer the Army an efficient solution to 
what might otherwise present serious logistical and political problems. Use of 
land without the burdens of ownership frees the Ministry from costly and 
administratively complex management tasks, while negotiation of rights can 
be undertaken with the landowner without reference to the local authority or 
to any process of public review. The acquisition of rights to train in the 
Galloway Forest only became known to the public and local authorities in the 
area two years after the event, following the appearance of land holdings 
statistics in the Defence White Paper<28l. 
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But is Scotland particularly heavily militarised in terms of MoD access to 
land? Analysis of the statistics, interestingly, suggests not: 
Table 1 
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The figures show that Scotland and Northern Ireland have a particularly 
low level of MoD owned and leased land as a proportion of total land area, and 
even when the 70,500 hectares of training rights in Scotland are included, MoD 
land is a smaller proportion of total land area than in the UK as a whole. Only 
in terms of MoD land per 1000 population does Scotland appear to have a 
greater burden than the rest of the country, and then only when rights to land 
are included. 
The available statistics are not, however, the full picture on MoD land 
use. Military exercises, large and small, take place in many areas outside MoD 
land. These may be areas where training licences have been negotiated with 
landowners, but for periods considered too short for inclusion in the statistics 
(typically, a year), or they may be areas where specific one-off agreements are 
reached to permit a particular exercise to be carried out. There is no 
comprehensive published information on the extent of these activities, but 
research carried out at Aberdeen Univerity in 1976 identified 61locations of 
private land in Scotland north of the Central Belt which had been used by the 
Army and Marines for exercises between January 1975 and July 1976<29l. 
Amongst the more frequent activities are Mountain and Arctic Warfare 
Training by the Royal Marines in the Cuillins and the Cairngorms, amphibious 
training in the Glenelg area, and Army special forces and infantry training in 
Glen Garry. 
Without evidence on the extent of these activities, and their distribution 
throughout the UK, it is not possible to judge whether Scotland receives 'more 
than its fair share'. One must therefore make do with the official statistics. On 
that basis, the conclusion must be that, in purely statistical terms, Scotland is 
no more militarised than other parts of the UK, and that the level of perception 
of militarisation cannot be explained simply by the military's access to 
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resources or scale of activities in Scotland. Put another way, for a type of land
use which covers only just over 1% of Scotland's land area, the defence estate
is a focus of disproportionate political debate. 
It would be over-stating the case to argue that Scotland had a monopoly
on public concern about military land use. Public inquiries over MoD
proposals in various parts of England suggest that the land issue has a
nationwide currency, and opposition to military activities in the English and
Welsh National Parks has been particularly vociferous<30l. But the plain facts
of the scale of military access to land in Scotland are an insufficient explanation
of the level of public opposition to military land expansion. 
Some explanation of the generally negative reaction to defence land
acquisition may be found by looking at the local, rather than national scale. 
The English experience is illustrative here. Many of the particularly
contentious attempted land acquisitions by the Army in the 1980s took place
close to urban areas, on land regarded as having high recreational value
(Holcombe Moor, Lancashire, 1986); or in green belt areas (Luddesdown,
Kent, 1984), where opposition was widespread, well-informed and had local
authority backing. The fact that many of these Army training areas contribute
nothing to the local economy means that the MoD cannot count on a section of
local opinion which might have an economic stake in their proposals<31 l. 
Scotland has seen fewer cases of Army land acquisitions leading to public
inquiries - the last one concerned the development of the Castlelaw firing 
range on the south side ofthe Pentland Hills in 1979. More recently, however, 
an Army interest in further expansion of its land on the Pentlands was 
abandoned very early in the process after it became clear that opposition from 
both the local authority and recreational groups in the area would be
vigorous<32). 
The Pentlands case shows that in areas where recreational demands are 
high, particularly in close proximity to centres of population, public feelings 
about military land use run high. But another facet of the difficulties facing the 
MoD in attempting to expand their training land was demonstrated by the 
response to their consolidation of a training rights agreement with the Forestry 
Commission over some 50,000 hectares of Galloway in the late 1980s. The new 
training licence only came to light some 18 months after it was signed and local 
politicians, including at least one Conservative, were particularly angered by 
the MoD's failure to consult the local authority or community interests<33l. 
The Army is therefore caught in a cleft stick - it can seek outright 
acquisition, following established procedures of consultation and public 
review; or it can seek less public means of increasing its training facilities, for 
example through informal agreements with landowners. In the former case, it 
must be prepared to explain fully its plans in public, answer criticisms, and risk 
either rejection of its proposals or amendments which impact on the 
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training value of the land. In the latter case, the training facilities are likely to 
be limited in scope and hedged with restrictions imposed by the owner; and the 
Army runs the risk of adverse publicity at a later date if major areas are 
acquired without public consultation. 
Low Flying 
One final aspect of military activity in Scotland which engenders 
considerable public concern is low flying training by military jet aircraft. The 
effects of sudden aircraft noise, particularly in quiet rural areas, can be 
frightening, and there is a growing catalogue of cases in which people and 
animals have suffered accidents, stress and ill health as a result of being 
overflown. The chairman of a NATO study of low flying aircraft noise said in 
1987 that "there are few aspects of peacetime military activity which provoke 
more adverse public reaction"<34>. 
The particularly negative reaction to low flying has several facets besides 
the obvious one of noise disturbance. First, it takes place over most of the 
country - including the fringes of urban areas - well beyond MoD land and 
often far away from any military installations; second, it is not subjected to any 
legislation, local authority jurisdiction or public consultation processes; third, 
the danger of crashes is seen as a major public safety hazard; and finally, low 
flying is linked to an offense-oriented military doctrine which looks 
increasingly inappropriate in an era of vanishing threats. 
Perversely, however, the intensity of low flying training can be seen as a 
measure of the effectiveness of a country's will to fight- the credibility of its 
deterrence. A state which is prepared to run the domestic political risk of 
fielding continual criticism from its population over the disturbance from low 
flying, and which trains its pilots to a peak of combat readiness on a daily basis 
in peacetime, is projecting a strong image of a nation fully prepared to go to 
war. 
As with other aspects of the military presence in Scotland, it is commonly 
held that proportionately more low flying takes place north of the border than 
in England or Wales. When, in early 1990, the National Audit Office (NAO) 
produced a report stating that the opposite was true - that only 10% of low 
flying took place in Scotland, which makes up about one third of the area 
available for low flying in Britain - there was an immediate outcry from the 
Scottish press and MPs, particularly as the NAO seemed to be suggesting that 
shifting more low flying to Scotland could alleviate the disturbance in the more 
frequently-overflown and densely-populated parts of England and Wales<35l. 
In some respects, the NAO's contention that Scotland does not shoulder 
its fair share of the burden seems reasonable. Northamptonshire, for example, 
forms such a busy channel for low flying military aircraft en route from bases in 
East Anglia to the low flying areas of Wales, Devon and Cornwall, that it has 
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been dubbed 'The Ho Chi Minh Trail' by pilots(36l. The density of the low 
flying air traffic in other areas such as Lincolnshire, South Yorkshire, East 
Anglia, North Wales and Cumbria is so great that pilots are instructed to 
follow one-way routes along valleys to reduce the risk of mid-air collisions; but 
only two such routes exist in the whole of Scotland<37l. 
However, subsequent evidence to the House of Commons Defence 
Committee's inquiry into low flying showed that the NAO's conclusion was 
based on incomplete data. Their figures took no account of the different types 
of low flying conducted in different parts of the country. A very high 
proportion of low flying in south-east and south-west England, and in 
Shropshire, is by helicopters, which fly slower and spend less time on each low-
level sortie. In Yorkshire and Lincolnshire, a high proportion is by smaller and 
slower aircraft such as the Jet Provost trainer. However in Scotland, much of 
the low flying is carried out by the faster, higher performance aircraft such as 
the F-111, Tornado and Jaguar. These types cover much more ground on each 
sortie, and are significantly noisier than smaller training aircraft. The Scottish 
perception of greater burden may therefore not be as far from the truth as the 
NAO report suggested<38l. 
Scotland's less restricted airspace and sparser population has also 
attracted two particularly disturbing forms of low flying- ultra-low training, 
down to 100 feet above ground level, and night low flying. Britain is the only 
country in Europe to permit flying at less than 250 feet over its own citizens, 
and the vast majority of it is conducted in two areas of Scotland- the north-
west Highlands, and most of southern and south-west Scotland (a small 
amount is also carried out in mid-Wales). The same area in the north-west 
Highlands is also the only area in western Europe where aircraft are allowed to 
fly on instruments- for example in bad weather, and/or at night- as low as 250 
feet off the ground. The 100 foot area in the Borders was more than doubled in 
size in 1988 without any process of prior consultation, while the frequency of 
low flying in the Borders in general more than doubled between 1980 and 
1986(3~). 
That the effects of low flying may be seen as the main military-
environmental problem in Scotland is therefore not surprising. With the 
collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the MoD is now faced with demands not merely 
for mitigation measures, but for wholesale revision of its strategy and major 
reductions in the amount of low-level training. 
Planning Procedure 
Faced with opposition to its land acquisitions, the MoD has been under 
growing pressure in recent years to pay more attention to its environmental 
policies, and in particular to demonstrate its bona fides in respect of 
development planning procedures. As a government department, the MoD is 
not subject to the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act 1984, 
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which is the basis for development planning in Britain. This means that the 
MoD could, constitutionally, go ahead with any development adjudged to be 
necessary in the interests of national security. 
In practice, however, the MoD takes a much more conciliatory line. 
Under the provisions of Scottish Development Department (SDD) Circular 
21/84, all government departments - including the MoD - "will consult 
planning authorities before proceeding with development (includin~ material 
changes of use) which would otherwise require planning permission" 40). Many 
of the MoD's developments could also be implemented without consultation 
with the local authority under the provisions of the General Development 
Order (GDO), but it is notable that SDD Circular 21184 states that 
government departments will only use the GDO for developments similar to 
those permitted for local authorities and private developers under the Order. 
In other words, the Crown claims no special privileges or rights in these cases. 
Moreover, even in cases where government departments do use the GDO to 
avoid the normal planning consultation procedures, "departments have 
agreed" to notify local planning authorities in cases where developments are 
"likely to be of special concern to the authority or the public"<4n. 
Under the Circular 21184 procedure, the MoD is required to submit a 
'Notice of Proposed Development' to the relevant local authority for any new 
project. The planning authority then treats the notification as if it were a 
conventional planning application, and has two months in which to make 
comments to the MoD, having publicised the proposal. In the event of the 
local authority objecting to the proposal, the Ministry will refer it to SDD. 
thereafter, any specific local authority objections may be dealt with by 
mitigation measures agreed in informal meetings between the MoD and the 
local authority. 
If agreement cannot be reached by this method, the proposal can be 
referred by the Secretary of State for Scotland to a non-statutory local 
planning inquiry. This is by nature a limited affair, restricted to considering 
only those aspects of the development which are within the competence and 
jurisdiction of the local planning authority. The underlying need for the 
project, and consideration of strategic alternatives- for example, in the case of 
Army training land, an evaluation of the Army's national training land 
requirements, as outlined by the Barron Report- are beyond the scope of local 
planning inquiries. Only in cases of major national significance will a full 
Planning Inquiry Commission, which can look at these wider aspects, be 
instituted. 
In the event of a local planning inquiry taking place, the inquiry reporter 
may make recommendations, or may leave consideration of the inquiry's 
findings to the Secretary of State. Either way, the Secretary of State has the 
final jurisdiction, including the power to overturn both local authority 
objections and the Inquiry Reporter's recommendations. In the case of 
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military developments, he will take advice from his Cabinet colleague the 
Defence Secretary before making a final decision. The result, very often, is 
merely a confirmation of what the MoD originally asked for. The two most 
prominent recent cases in Scotland- the Castle law Hill firing range inquiry in 
1979, and the Stornoway air base inquiry in 1981- illustrate this point. In both 
cases, although the Inquiry Reporter found against the development on 
planning grounds, they were approved by the Secretary of State on grounds of 
"over-riding national interest". 
Many of these criticisms apply equally to the planning process as it relates 
to civil developments. The arguments are well-rehearsed: vast public expense, 
limited remit, bias in favour of the developer because of failure to fund 
objectors, and the ability of government ministers simply to ignore the 
inquiry's findings<42l. But for military developments, the impregnability ofthe 
'national interest' argument and the wholly discretionary provisions for 
ordering a public inquiry remain major obstacles for any objectors, and 
technical and operational secrecy prevents full discussion of the purposes or 
likely impacts of these projects. 
Untimately, of course, the entire planning consultation procedure 
established under SD D Circular 21184 and its English and Welsh equivalents is 
discretionary when the government department concerned is the MoD. 
Paragraph 6 of the circular states that "none of these consultations or 
notifications can fully apply to proposals involving national security." 
In addition, any government department can circumvent much of the 
public review process by marking their Notice of Proposed Development 
(NOPD) 'Special Urgency'. In this case, the requirement for the local 
authority to publicise the proposal does not apply, and any comments must be 
received by the developing department within 14 days of the planning 
authority's receipt of the NOPD. If the planning authority makes no response 
within that time limit, the developer will assume that there are no objections or 
comments, and implement the project. The planning authority will be given at 
least 48 hours notice of construction starting. This procedure was used when 
the Admiralty Marine Technology Establishment built a new and highly 
classified underwater calibration range for submarines on the island of South 
Rona, between Skye and Applecross, in 1977<43l. 
In cases where the MoD regards it as desirable that no publicity be given 
to developments, SDD Circular 21/84 also allows the Ministry to advise 
planning authorities to omit certain particulars of projects from their register 
of planning applications or to exclude them from the documentation made 
available for public inspection<44l. 
Environmental Impact Assessment 
The growth of environmentalism, and more particularly of its 
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mobilisation as a national and international political issue, is increasingly 
challenging the military's environmental policies and openness to public 
scrutiny. Britain's military, which continues to derive its constitutional 
legitimacy and status directly from the Crown rather than through legislative 
provisions, is unaccustomed to having to subject its ptogrammes to detailed 
legal or public review. Other countries have rather different approaches to 
military-environmental policy, particularly in regard to the use of formal 
environmental impact assessments or reviews. 
In this respect, the United States leads the field. Under the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, all government projects must undergo an 
environmental impact analysis which is commissioned and funded by the 
project proponent. Once completed, the Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS) forms the basis of public hearings. Objectors can receive substantial 
public funding which enables them to hire their own technical experts and take 
a full part in public hearings.<45l. 
Canada has a system much like the United States. All Federal 
Government sponsored projects expected to have a significant environmental 
impact must undergo environmental review. Although limited environmental 
reviews of proposed US bomber training routes in Canada have been carried 
out, the first major test of the Canadian system against a military project has 
been taking place since 1987. This concerns proposals to expand existing 
NATO combat aircraft training facilities in Labrador, to accommodate a new 
training centre, weapons ranges and low flying areas. The Goose Bay project 
has shown the Canadian Department of National Defence to be extremely 
poorly equipped to deal with the requirements of an elaborate and 
sophisticated environmental review process. In spring 1990, at a time when all 
the signs were that the success of the opposition in using the review process to 
mobilise-their arguments would result in NATO withdrawing its proposal and 
shifting the project to a site in Turkey instead, NATO announced 
abandonment of the project altogether because of a combination of budget 
stringency and the collapse of the military threat<46l. 
A requirement for EIS has also recently been introduced in the 
Netherlands for army training areas, naval and air bases, and the Dutch 
Council for Environment and Nature Research has been arguing for an 
extension of these studies to include assessments of impacts on arms control as 
well as the natural environment<47l. 
The trend towards adoption of some form of EIS for major government 
projects in European countries has been driven largely by EC legislation. EC 
Directive 85/337, adopted in 1985, provides that projects likely to have a 
significant impact on the environment must undergo an environmental impact 
assessment (EIA). These include petro-chemical works, power stations, 
motorways, airports etc. Notably, however, projects servin~ national defence 
purposes are exempt from the provisions of the Directive <4 l 
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Despite much delay and political wrangling, the Directive was brought 
into effect in the UK in July 1988. In Scotland, they are set out in SDD Circular 
13/88, which, in a significant shift in military-environmental policy, goes 
beyond the terms of the directive by stating that "the Ministry of Defence will, 
in appropriate circumstances and subject to considerations affecting national 
security, Rrovide environmental statements in respect of major defence 
projects"< 9l. 
The first environmental impact assessment of a military project in the UK 
was carried out in 1984- dealing with the development of the Clyde Submarine 
Base for the Trident missile system. However it took place in a highly perverse 
situation: the local planning authority had refused to agree to the 
development; the Secretary of State had refused to institute a public planning 
inquiry; the Regional Council had then conducted its own independent non-
statutory public inquiry; and the Navy only conducted its EIA six months after 
the completion of the Regional Council's inquiry report. Moreover, the Clyde 
Submarine Base EIA was prepared before EIAs became European law, and 
before any clear idea of UK standards and procedures had emerged. The very 
existence of the Navy's EIA was kept secret until12 days before its release; it 
was conducted without any consultation with local authorities; and it was 
criticised for a numQer of omissions and deficiencies, particularly in relation to 
safety hazards<50l. 
Two further EIAs have been conducted by the Defence Ministry in 
England since then, but in early 1990 it was announced that an environmental 
impact assessment would accompany the NOPD for a trial Extremely Low 
Frequency submarine communications transmitter to be sited in Glen 
Garry<51 l. Ironically, this project is now unlikely to go ahead for a variety of 
technical and strategic reasons; so Scottish planning authorities and the public 
will have to await some other military project before having the opportunity to 
judge how the MoD is interpreting the EC legislation and SDD Circular on 
environmental impact assessment, and whether these provisions are any 
improvement on the existing discretionary public inquiry procedure. 
Conclusions 
The evolution of military-environmental policy in Britain in the last ten 
years suggests that much of the motive for the introduction of more 
comprehensive reviews of military developments has been concerned with 
achieving better public relations rather than finding ways of avoiding or 
mitigating adverse environmental impacts. In a system where the 
environmental regulatory bureaucracy is relatively informal and powerless (in 
contrast to, for example the US Environmental Protection Agency), this is not 
surprising. But the military will come under increasing pressure not only from 
EC and national legislation, but from growing public concern about access to 
land, and public health hazards. An environmental policy founded mainly on 
the military's ability to define the boundaries of environmental assessment 
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itself, and limit discussion on key aspects of its activities, cannot last long. 
Interestingly, the Soviet Union appears to be using increased public 
environmental concerns about military activity to its own public relations 
advantage. In at least two cases in Poland and Czechoslovakia, Soviet fighter 
squadrons have been withdrawn to the USSR, ostensibly after protests about 
noise or safety fears. In the spring of 1990, TASS announced that construction 
of a new radar station in the Ukraine was being abandoned because of local 
fears of public health dangers from electromagnetic radiationcsz). The chances 
are high that these units were scheduled for withdrawal in any case under the 
cutbacks announced by Gorbachev in December 1988, or as a result of 
financial restrictions, but the linkage to environmental concerns offered the 
Soviet military the prospect of a public relations coup. 
Continued progress in arms control and the demonstrable reductions in 
the Warsaw Pact military threat will place new demands on the military to 
participate in more formal environmental reviews. Further, since war is less 
likely now than at any time since 1945, the armed forces may have to accept 
that the price of peace is willingness to reduce the high levels of combat 
readiness and intensity of training that are the source of much of the military's 
adverse impact on the human and natural environment. In other words, 
defence posture will come to be shaped more and more by factors other than 
the scale and nature of the threat. When that happens, it will represent one of 
the most significant shifts in the balance between the state and civil society in 
the history of the United Kingdom. 
But while the decline of the threat may lead to reductions in the scale of 
the military's impacts on the environment, it will not lead to their elimination. 
Nor will it be sufficient simply to alter the military's public relations policies in 
order to cope with increased environmental awareness. Military training 
activity and the construction and operation of military facilities are likely to be 
integrated further into the civil environmental planning process, including 
formal public review of proposals and elimination of discrepancies between 
civil and military environmental regulations. 
The MoD has yet to be tested on its ability to carry through a project 
which is subjected to an environmental impact assessment and a public 
inquiry, in addition to the normal planning notification procedures; but having 
faced the challenge of adopting EC environmental legislation when it was 
under no legal obligation to do so, the Ministry is likely to have to accept that 
such detailed public scrutiny, in an era of rapidly reducing military threats, will 
result in projects being scaled back or even rejected. 
In Scotland, where the most significant military-environmental policy 
issues are the use of privately-owned land for training, and the noise from low 
flying aircraft, legislative developments are perhaps less relevant. This may 
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immunity, so far, of naval forces from any arms control talks, may also lead to 
the military presence remaining at much the same level for the foreseeable 
future. But whatever Scotland's defence role, it is clear that in future public 
concern about the environmental impact of military activity will become a 
significant determinant of how and where the armed forces train. 
Malcolm Spaven, Research Fellow, Department of Sociology, University of 
Edinburgh. 
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